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the noble Army of the Potomac vanquish its own enemy that Grant gave up the more attractive vision, and the book before us is evidence of the scant thanks he got for it from those who should have been first in gratitude. It is hard to repress derisive laughter when a nephew of Meade quotes against Grant the Spanish equivalent of the English proverb, "One beat the bush and another caught the bird."

If history shows anything it is that the law to make Grant lieutenant-general (for his name might as well have been in its text) was passed when Congress and the country were almost in despair because the victory of Gettysburg was followed by six months of inaction or harmless peripatetics between Washington and Culpeper; because Lee was kept so little employed by a superior army that he dared to send one-third of his smaller force away to help Bragg beat Rosecrans at Chickamauga, and no advantage was taken of it. Had Meade clung to Lee in '63 as Sherman did to Johnston in '64, so that his campaign, like the other, would have been known among the soldiers as the "hundred days under fire," Richmond might have been taken nearly a year before Atlanta, and we should never have heard of its captor being "overshadowed" by anybody. He had his chance.

There is in Mr. Bache's book a good deal of careful analysis of army movements, much good topographical description, aided by maps which he has skilfully modified to meet the wants of the general reader. Its real significance, however, is in the controversial matter of which samples have been given, and with which every chapter is full. He has often been obliged to stop short in his campaign details because the scale to which he was writing would make his book too large, and this has prevented him from giving the reader the means of testing the value of the general judgments which he announces.

The Battle of Franklin, Tennessee, November 30, 1864. A Monograph. By JACOB D. COX, Late Major-General Commanding Twenty-third Army Corps. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1897. Pp. x, 351.)

GENERAL COX—scholar, practised writer and excellent officer—gives the public in this volume a very clear account of the campaign in Tennessee under Gen. Thomas, after Gen. Sherman had left Hood, who had long resisted Sherman's three armies, to be taken care of by Thomas with the fragments, when 62,000 selected men had been withdrawn by Sherman for his March to the Sea. The general view of the situation, and the strategy of the campaign, the statement of the tactics and the description of the fighting at Franklin, are excellent. But the assumption in the outset, as if it were not a matter to be questioned, that Gen. Thomas was left with adequate forces, is wholly unsupported by the facts, as is now well known by all participants. It will attract the reader's attention to find in the opening paragraph that Franklin itself as a hard-fought field would not justify the volume, but that full cause for publication will be

found, among other things, in the fact that this battle marked the "beginning of the end" of the Civil War, and justified Sherman in the division of his forces for the March to the Sea. As very few students of war history will accept those positions, they will, naturally, seek another reason for publication. This they will not find clearly revealed until they reach the last two chapters, with the titles, "An unexpected Controversy," and "Controverted Points." The contention, here made clear, is that Gen. Cox selected the line of battle at Franklin, and commanded the line throughout the battle, except as Gen. Stanley, of the Fourth Corps, came up at the time of the break in the line, helped to restore it, was immediately wounded and left the field. That Gen. Cox's book was written as an introduction to this controversy sufficiently appears from the paragraph which precedes the final chapter setting forth the points of his controversy. "The fulness of the narrative in the preceding pages will enable me to make the summary comparatively brief." A space equal to one fourth of the volume is then devoted to the points of contention given above.

While there is no question of Gen. Cox's ability and energy in establishing the line indicated to him by Gen. Schofield, rapidly and effectively entrenching it, and supplementing it all by distinguished conduct in action, the claim which he makes, which is virtually that of commanding in the battle, cannot be sustained. Gen. Schofield occupied a most commanding position, immediately overlooking the whole field, where he could direct everything, not only on the line where Cox's two divisions were fighting, but upon the other very important portions of the line occupied by Stanley's troops, including the points where the Union cavalry were engaged, and where other troops of Stanley were posted to observe movements of the enemy threatening the Union rear. Gen. Schofield, in his recently published book, twice records that he personally directed Gen. Cox where to form the troops as they came up, this being committed to Cox because Gen. Stanley was commanding the rear guard and engaging the enemy to retard his advance. In regard to the remaining point of Gen. Cox's contention, Gen. Schofield, being called on by Gen. Cox as the officer in supreme command for his understanding of the matter, wrote:

"It has seemed to me that your use of the term 'Commandant upon the line' was unfortunate, it being liable to be misunderstood as intended to imply that you had been assigned to the command of all the troops in line on the south side of the river. The contingency which was anticipated of an attempt of the enemy to force a crossing of the river above Franklin, which would, or might, have taken Stanley to some distant point on the north side of the river, and which might thus have led to your assignment to the command of all the troops remaining on the south side, did not happen." General Schofield wrote Gen. Stanley as positively in regard to the matter, declaring further that Stanley was where he should have been throughout the battle.

While these things effectually dispose of the points for the establish-

ment of which the book was written, its non-controversial chapters, which make up three-quarters of the volume, undoubtedly present the best account of the movements in the battle of Franklin yet published.

The discussion of the division of Sherman's forces when he decided to leave Hood in his rear for Thomas to deal with, while with all his army except two small corps, the convalescents, and the sick, he started for the sea, is seriously marred by withholding several essential elements without which there can be no fair presentation of the case. For example, the force which Sherman took to the sea is stated at "about 50,000." Sherman himself in his *Memoirs* says it was 62,204, that "the most extraordinary efforts had been made to purge the army," and "that all on this exhibit may be assumed to have been able-bodied, experienced soldiers, well armed, well equipped and provided, as far as human foresight could, with all the essentials of life, strength, and vigorous action." On the other hand, of those sent back to Thomas, the terms of service of 15,000 expired within a week after Hood's movement began, and their places were in part supplied with 12,000 perfectly new troops. It was necessary to ransack the hospitals and organize convalescents for the field, and also, at last, to put citizens and quartermasters' employes into the ranks, and Thomas, when the real situation was discovered at Washington, was urged to send north for militia. While this was the condition confronting Thomas, and while both Schofield and Thomas reported officially that at the time of Franklin Hood largely outnumbered the Union force, General Cox gives Hood's strength as 42,000 or 43,000, and asserts that "The effective force under General Thomas, in middle and southern Tennessee, was 65,000 officers and men present for duty equipped, which was the official phrase indicating complete readiness for active service." This single statement, in the light of the facts given above, to which he makes no reference, should dispose of his book as history; and also of the theory which General Cox advances that the writing of his book is justified by the demonstration which Franklin gives that Sherman made a proper division of his army when he marched away from Hood to the sea.

H. V. BOYNTON.

Report and Accompanying Papers of the Commission appointed by the President of the United States "to investigate and report upon the true divisional Line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana." (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1897. Four vols., pp. 406, 723, 517; Vol. IV., atlas of 76 plates.)

THESE volumes may be considered as products of American scholarship, apart entirely from the policy that gave rise to them. They are undoubtedly the best contribution hitherto made towards clearing up the merits of the boundary dispute. This indeed is not very high praise, for the previous contributions, at least the official ones, were not of the highest order. The interminable series of "statements," "cases" and